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disturbed, and that this was public policy, as indeed, other courts have
done.38
Of course, if one holds that it is against public policy to allow parol
gifts causa mortis to be established on the sole, uncorroborated testimony
of the donee, the Collinson case may be decided on that one fact, making
further discussion academic. However, if the conclusion is that such
gifts may be so established, it follows that the alleged donee may testify
in his own behalf, although in some jurisdictions, statutes prohibit such
testimony. As pointed out by Emmert, J. in a vigorous dissent,84 the
modern tendency has not been to extend the class of incompetent wit-
nesses beyond the clear provisions of the statutes. 5
Further, the dissent argued, that if the alleged donee may testify, and
that testimony is unimpeached and uncontradicted in any material matter,
and every circumstance and reasonable inference both from her conduct
and testimony corroborated her evidence as to the gift, a trial court,
as a matter of law, may not disregard it.s8
Thus, we are led to the crux of the conflict. It is a conflict that
transcends the law of gifts causa mortis, and may fairly be said to be
one of the continuing, and most perplexing problems of our legal system:
how far should a court go in varying the common law which derived
great force from custom in regard to observance?
Since our legal system permits the legislative will of the people to
be manifest, it would seem that courts ought to be chary of inferring
that a change in one facet of the previous law by legislative enactment,
gives sanction to a court to change another via judicial fiat.
TAXATION-CONTEST PRIZES HELD TAXABLE
A philanthropist established a contest in 1945 wherein he offered
$25,000 for the best symphony written by an American composer. The
winning symphony was to remain the property of the composer sub-
ject to certain conditions.' The appellant, hereinafter referred to as
the taxpayer, a musician, composer, and college professor by profes-
sion, had composed a symphony during the years 1937, 1938, and 1939.
33 McKeon v. Van Slyck, 233 N.Y. 392, 119 N.E. 851 (1918). The court concluded
that corroboration is not essential as a matter of law and it is error to instruct the
jury otherwise.
34 In re Collinson's Estate, 108 N.E. 2d 700 (Ind., 1952).
35 2 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 578, 578a (3rd ed., 1940).
36 In re Collinson's Estate, 108 N.E. 2d 700, 707 (Ind., 1952).
1 The conditions were in part that the Detroit Orchestra, Inc., a nonprofit organ-
ization, shall have all synchronization rights as to motion pictures and all mechanical
rights as to phonograph recordings, electric transcriptions, and music rolls; ex-
clusive right to authorize the first performance of the composition; right to desig-
nate the publisher; right to give a broadcast performance within one year.
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It was then placed aside until he entered it in this contest during the
year 1946. He was awarded the prize in 1947. Taxpayer claimed benefit
of Sec. 107 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code2 and computed his tax
for the current year, 1947, as though the $25,000 had been received
ratably during the years 1937, 1938, and 1939. Subsequently he filed for
refund on the theory that this prize constituted a gift under Sec. 22
(b) (3), Internal Revenue Code,3 and was not taxable. The Commis-
sioner assessed a deficiency, contending this to be taxable income4 and
placed the income as though it had been ratably received over the 36-
month period ending 1947. 5 The District Court held that the cash prize
qualified as a gift under Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 22 (b) (3)6 and
should not be taxable in the year 1947 or any other year. 7 The Court of
Appeals overruled the lower court in holding for the Commissioner on
both points." The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
because of a conflict with a previous decision" and upheld the Circuit
Court's findings. Robertson v. United States, 72 S. Ct. 994 (1952).
The taxpayer contended and the District Court 10 found that the in-
2 nt. Rev. Code S 107 (b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 107 (b) (1949). "For the purposes of
this subsection, the term "artistic work or invention," . . . means a literary, musical,
or artistic composition . . . or a patent or copyright covering an invention of or a
literary, musical, or artistic composition .... If, in the taxable year, the gross income
of any individual from a particular artistic work or invention by him is not less
than 80 per centum of the gross income in respect of such artistic work or invention
in the taxable year plus the gross income therefrom in previous taxable years and
the twelve months immediately succeeding the close of the taxable year, the tax
attributable to the part of such gross income of the taxable year which is not taxable
as a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months
shall not be greater than the aggregate of the taxes attributable to such part had it
been received ratably over that part of the period preceding the close of the taxable
year but not more than 36 calendar months."
3 Int. Rev. Code § 22 (b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 22 (b) (1949). "The following items
shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under this
chapter: . . . (3) Gifts, bequests, devises, and inheritances."
4Int. Rev. Code § 22 (a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 22 (a) (1949). "General definitions.
Gross income includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or
compensation for personal service . . . of whatever kind and in whatever form
paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or
dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or
use of interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or
the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits
and income derived from any source whatever. .. "
5 Int. Rev. Code 5 107 (b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 107 (b) (1949); note 2 supra.
6 Int. Rev. Code § 22 (b) (3), 26 U.S.C.A. § 22 (b) (3) (1949).
7Robertson v. U.S., 93 F. Supp. 660 (D.C. Utah, 1950).
8 U.S. v. Robertson, 190 F. 2d 680 (C.A. 10th, 1951).
9 McDermott v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 150 F. 2d 585 (App. D.C.,
1945).
10 Robertson v. U.S., 93 F. Supp. 660 (D.C. Utah, 1950).
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come was a gift, based on the following arguments: the contest was
sponsored by a philanthropist for the purpose of furthering music and
creating a unity between the Americas; the. sponsor derived no profits
from the contest; the composer retained ownership of the composition;
the taxpayer's purpose in composing the work was comparable to that of
a great poet who is inspired to write an immortal poem and thus make
an outstanding contribution to the field of music; and under the McDer-
mott v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue case 1 this prize would con-
stitute a gift.
The Circuit Court disposed of the taxpayer's arguments by finding that
the compensation was the result of professional skill and training of
the musician and, when he entered the contest, he was offering the re-
sults of his skill and training in exchange for a chance to win the prize
money.' 2 The court stated that the practical test for purposes of de-
termining whether an income is a gift is whether it was received gratui-
tously and in exchange for nothing.'8 Here the taxpayer not only gave
the results of his skill and training but also gave up certain rights, pre-
viously set forth, relating to his composition. Thus something was in
fact given in exchange for the prize. The court further stated that the
taxability of a prize or award is determined in accordance with the
law applicable to the recipient and the fact that the payer has no financial
gain from such payment is of no consequence. The recipient received
the prize as a result of his labor just as though he had been paid for the
use of it. This court found that the taxpayer was entitled to relief under
Sec. 107 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code but ruled that this section
expressly calls for the proration of the amount received in a taxable
year "over that part of the period preceding the close of the taxable
years" not to exceed 36 months. Thus the prize was to be prorated over
the years 1945, 1946, and 1947 as prescribed by the Commissioner.
The Supreme Court in holding for the Commissioner stated that
acceptance by the contestant of an offer tendered by a sponsor of a
contest creates an enforceable contract, 4 and payment of a prize to the
winning contestant is in legal effect the discharge of a contractual ob-
ligation and is not a gift under Sec. 22 (b) (3) of the Internal Revenue
11 150 F. 2d 585 (App. D.C., 1945).
12U.S. v. Robertson, 190 F. 2d 680 (C.A. 10th, 1951).
IsHelvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943); Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); Bausch's Estate v.
Commissioner of Internal, Revenue, 186 F. 2d 313 (C.A. 2nd, 1951); Thomas v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 135 F. 2d 378 (C.A. 5th, 1943); Sportwear
Hosiery Mills v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 129 F. 2d 376 (C.A. 3rd, 1942);
Willkie v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 127 F. 2d 953 (C.A. 6th, 1942).
14Brown v. Morrisey and Walker, 106 N.J.L. 307, 150 Atl. 330 (1930); Palmer
v. Central Board of Education, 220 Pa. 568, 70 Atl. 433 (1908); Groves v. Carolene
Products Co., 324 Ill. App. 102, 57 N.E. 2d 507 (1944); Rest., Contracts S 521 (1932).
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Code.15 The court further stated that payment of money to the taxpayer
in return for services rendered cannot escape taxation as a gift merely
because the donor has received no economic benefit.16 This court gave
Section 107 (b) the same interpretation as the Circuit Court in finding
that the 36-month period should end with the current taxable year. It is
interesting to note that, even though both the Circuit Court and the Su-
preme Court arrived at the same conclusion as to the taxability of the
prize money to the recipient, the conclusion of each court rests on a dif-
ferent basis. The Circuit Court found that the prize was taxable by way
of excluding it from the gift category, whereas the Supreme Court ra-
tionalized that there was a contractual obligation here.
The primary question in this case was whether this was a nontaxable
gift or not.17 The Internal Revenue Code broadly defines gross income,
and such all-inclusive terms indicate a legislative intent that income
should be taxed comprehensively. 8 The Code lists incomes which are
to be excluded from gross income, and an income must clearly come
within these bounds to be nontaxable.' 9 The problem of the taxability
of prizes won in contests has been before the courts on previous occa-
sions. Prize winners generally are required to include their prize in their
income tax returns. With few exceptions, the Internal Revenue Bureau
has consistently held that prizes were includable in the gross income
of the recipient on the theory that such awards represented compensa-
tion for meeting the conditions of a contest or for aiding in the adver-
tising program of the sponsor.20 The holder of the winning number on
a meal ticket was required to pay a tax on the fair market value of an
automobile he won.21
In holding that awards for scientific achievement and outstanding
service, such as the Nobel Prize, were nontaxable where no personal
service was rendered and no competitive element was present, the
Bureau stated:
It appears that the award was made to the taxpayer in recognition of his
achievements in science and his services in promoting the public welfare. An
award of this kind made by one to whom no services have been rendered is a
gratuity as distinguished from compensation for services. Clearly the award
was not a competitive prize. This office is of the opinion, therefore, that the
amount received by the taxpayer constituted a gift and is exempt from income
tax.22
15 Robertson v. U.S., 343 U.S. 711 (1952).
16Int. Rev. Code S 22 (b) (3), 26 U.S.CA.. S 22 (b) (3) (1949).
17 Ibid.
18 Int. Rev. Code S 22 (a), 26 U.S.C.A. S 22 (a) (1949).
19Int. Rev. Code § 22 (b) and 116, U.S.C.A. S 22 (b) and 116 (1949).
20 I.T. 1651, June Cum. Bull. 54 (1923).
21 I.T. 1667, June Cum. Bull. 54 (1923).
22 G.C.M. 5881, June Cum. Bull. 28 (1929).
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The facts of the Robertson case differ from the above qualifications in
that the award was a competitive prize and was for services rendered.
The Circuit Court in the Robertson case cited Stein v. Commissioner28
and stated that where a person enters a contest which offers a valuable
award and wins and accepts that award its value is taxable to him be-
cause, if his primary motive were to advance an art or a scholarly
pursuit, he could refuse to accept the prize. However, the court failed
to take note that the Stein decision rested more heavily on the fact that
the payer treated the cost of the prize as an ordinary business expense
thereby making the prize almost automatically taxable to the recipient.
In this case, Pabst Brewery conducted a contest and gave prizes in cele-
bration' of an anniversary, which contest was used for business publicity.
The company treated the award not as a gift but as an ordinary business
expense for the current taxable year. Where the donor does not treat
the payments as an expense but charges them directly to surplus as in
Bogardus v. Commissioner,24 the court must look to the services rendered
by the recipient to establish taxability.
The Tax Court has liberalized the rule that prize winners are gen-
erally required to report their winnings in their income tax returns, by
holding that a "windfall" prize from a commercial radio program was
a gift, not includable in gross income in Washburn v. Commissioner.25
Here the court pointed out that the winner had employed no capital,
contributed no labor, made no wager, gave no endorsement of the spon-
sor's product, and assumed no obligation when she was awarded and
accepted the "Pot 0' Gold" money. Further, the donor had designated
the payment an "outright cash gift" and the court so found.
A prize of $3,000.00 awarded by the American Bar Association for the
best discussion on an assigned subject, which prize money was derived
from the income of a trust fund established for this purpose, was held
nontaxable in McDermott v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.26 Here
the court found that the purpose of the donor and the trustee, American
Bar Association, was to incite scholarly work by the gift, not to employ
or buy. The court distinguished between taxable prizes given for com-
mercial purposes and nontaxable awards for outstanding scholarly or
humanitarian achievement by stating:
Any services rendered by the recipient were not rendered to the trustee of
the fund and the trustee derived no profit as a result of the contest. This dis-
tinguishes this prize from puzzles, guessing contests, and publishers' contests
operated for commercial purposes.
23 14 T.C. 494 (1950).
24 302 U.S. 34 (1937).
25 5 T.C. 1333 (1945).
26 150 F.2d 585 (App. D.C., 1945).
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The importance of the donor receiving no economic benefit has been
introduced in other cases. 27
The Solicitor General did not petition for certiorari on this case; yet,
when the Robertson case came along several years later with similar
facts another circuit court (McDermott case was a circuit court deci-
sion) criticized the McDermott case by stating that the court in the
latter case placed too much importance on the donative intent of the
nonprofit association and on the nonpecuniary motive of the taxpayer.
The Supreme Court effectively overruled the McDermott case by stating
in the Robertson case that where there is a payment for services rendered,
it is immaterial whether the donor received an economic benefit from
the services.
The remaining question involved in the Robertson case concerns the
period over which income from a work that takes in excess of 36 months
to perform may be allocated for income tax purposes. This is a less
trying question as it simply involves an interpretation of Sec. 107 (b)
of the Internal Revenue Code. The hardship of taxing a person who
received all or nearly all of the income in one year, where he had worked
a number of years to earn this income, was first dealt with by Congress
in Sec. 220 of the Revenue Act of 1939, Sec. 107 of the Internal Revenue
Code. It provided in part that where personal services were rendered
by an individual over a period of five years or more from the beginning
to completion of the services and he had not received at least 95 per
cent of the pay until completion, the taxpayer could allocate the income
over the years included in the period. This section was subsequently
changed, primarily by the Revenue Act of 1942, reducing the period
to 36 months from five years along with other changes.
Sec. 107 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code is an exception under the
general rules governing taxation of income, and a taxpayer seeking to
avail himself of the benefits of this exception must bring himself clearly
within its bounds.28
The taxpayer offered the case of Williams v. United States2s as a
basis for allocating the 36-month period backwards from date of com-
pletion of his composition. The Williams case held that where an in-
ventor worked on an invention from 1925 to 1931 and received payment
27 Helvering v. Amreican Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943), where creditors' gratui-
tous cancellations of indebtedness without consideration were held to be gifts and
not income to debtor; Amirikian v. U.S., 100 F. Supp. 263 (D.C. Md., 1951), which
held that where a philanthropic trust, organized for purpose of encouraging and
stimulating interest and study in respect to development of arc welding industry,
offered a prize for a paper written on the industry, such prize was a gift.
28Smaet v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 F. 2d 333 (CA. 2d, 1945);
Lindstrom v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 149 F. 2d 344 (CA. 9th, 1945).
29 84 F. Supp. 362 (Ct. Cl., 1949).
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for this invention in 1942, he was entitled to compute his taxes as if
the sum received in 1942 had been received ratably during the 36-month
period ended on February 7, 1931, the date of completion. Both the
Circuit Court and the Supreme Court in the Robertson case found that
the statute expressly calls for proration of the amount received in a
taxable year "over that part of the period preceding the close of the
taxable year" not to exceed 36 months. Thus the income will be allocated
over the 36-month period preceding the close of the taxable year in
which received even though the actual work was performed in years
preceding the date of payment by more than 36 months.
Thus it appears that in nearly all cases of prizes won in contests the
value of the prize will be taxable unless it can be demonstrated that the
prize was given as a gift to aid the furtherance of science or education,
or the award is made in recognition of past achievements or present
abilities,80 and not given in exchange for services rendered. One must
look to the nature and intent of the donor8l and also determine whether
services were rendered by the recipient. If the donor is a nontaxable
philanthropic trust, it is easier to establish the requisite conditions neces-
sary to constitute the prize a gift.
CONTRACTS-COURT OF CLAIMS RULES REVOCATION OF
OFFER BEFORE ACCEPTANCE INEFFECTIVE
In response to a government solicitation, the plaintiff submitted a bid
(offer) on a contemplated contract. Prior to acceptance by the govern-
ment, but after the bids had been opened, the plaintiff attempted to revoke
this offer. In a very curious opinion the Court of Claims declared that
this revocation was ineffective. Refining Associates Inc. v. United States,
109 F. Supp. 259 (Ct. Cl., 1953).
In recent years the Court of Claims has made some pronouncements
concerning contract law which seem contra to all precedent and reason.
This was not so eight years ago, when in the case of Miller v. United
States,1 the court handed down a superlative decision presenting an accu-
rate analysis of the common law principles governing offer and accept-
ance of contracts.
The Miller case involved a plaintiff who, after submitting a bid of
30Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revneue, 279 U.S. 716
(1929).
81 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Jacobsen, 336 U.S. 28 (1949); Bogardus v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 302 U.S. 34 (1937); Smith v. Manning, 189 F. 2d
345 (C.A. 3rd, 1951); Poorman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 131 F. 2d 946
(C.A. 9th, 1942); Fisher v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 59 F. 2d 192 (C.A. 2d,
1932).
162 F. Supp. 327 (Ct. Cl., 1945).
